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You asked to see ~ s in this case - ,,-- ie'1 dafs:-,!eff>re' 
~ . ~ ., , ... , 
Conference. The petn •~ t"~~sp~ i~ not yet ~~- 4 • •' 
With regard to your notes on the pool memo, ::e - ground for ~ 
decision in favor of plaintiffs on the merits was state law, a(:A / 
~ 
construed by the state supreme court to avoid a conflict with J,.;;f-" 
EAHCA. (AS) EAHCA requires state law to provide certain righ~ 
(as a condition of funding), and provides a right of action in 
federal or state court to enforce those rights once administra-
tive proceedings are exhausted. 20 USCA §1415 (e) . In barring 
attorney's fees, CAl looked to the comprehensiveness of EAHCA 
remedies apparently because that statute provided the right of 
action, and because it was "the foundation of plaintiffs' vic-
tory," since the state court looked to it in construing state 
law. (A9) 
The more I have thought about this case, the less sure I am 
that CAl was wrong. Assuming th~t it was right to look to the 
'--, -- -------
EA HCA in the procedural posture here, then the question under Sea 
Clammers was whether EAHCA was intended entirely to replace sub-
.. ~-- -------------------
stantially identical §1983 remedies. It may not make any differ-
ence whether the §1983 remedies are based on federal statutes or 
the Constitution. Also, the legislative history of the previous-
ly enacted §1988 is not all that relevant to this inquiry, since 
it is based on the idea that Congress repealed (by implication) 
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(Aldrich, Campbell, Breyer) 
Smith, et al. (handicapped 
child) 
v. 
Robinson, et al. (RI school Federal/Civil Timely 
officials) 
1. SUMMARY: Where plaintiffs prevail on claims under a 
statute that does not include provision for award of attorney's 
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fees, can they recover fees under 42 USC §1988 or under the Reha-
bilitation Act's fee provision if the court does not reach the 
plaintiffs' essentially identical claims under those laws? 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Tommy Smith is a handi-
capped child. His education in a special school was paid for by 
the local school board. In November 1976, the board informed the 
Smiths that it would no longer pay the tuition because it be-
lieved the state mental 
The Smiths, petrs ~ e, 
health department was responsible for it. 
sued in federal court und~ l983 alleg-
~
. a violation ~ e process (no hearing) 
']_/ 
rimination on basis of handicap). The 
-;t;:: 
and equal protection 
court (ORI Pettine, 
C.J.) granted a preliminary injunction while petrs exhausted 
their administrative remedies. Petrs subsequently amended their 
complaint to inclu~ aims under the Education for All ~ di-
capped Children Act (EAHCA), 20 use §§1401 et seq., and th~ ha-
bilitation Act of 1973, 29 use §794. These claims alleged viola-
tions in denying Tommy a free appropriate education, discrimina-
tion on the basis of handicap, and refusal to grant an impartial 
hearing. Ultimately, the TC certified to the RI Sup. Ct. the 
question of which agency was responsible under RI law for Tommy's 
education. The SC said the local board was, stating that a con-
trary result risked placing the state's law in conflict with the 
federal EAHCA. The v;C granted a permanent injunction on this 
basis. The✓CAl affirmed. The federal statutory and constitu-
tional issues were not reached. ( /51,c-f-~'I-~ J__,1 ~ ?' ) r-::;:::--_ 
Petrs then sought attorney's fees. The local school board -
settled for the amount of fees incurred in obtaining the prelimi-
7 
· ' No. 82-2120 - - page 3. 
nary injunction, which had been granted on constitutional -grounds. Against the state, the TC awarded $32,109 in fees for 
proceedings before the state agencies and court, and in the fed-
eral courts. Although the EAHCA does not provide for fees, the 
Rehabilitation Act and §1988 do, and petrs' claims under those 
statutes were colorable and nonfrivolous. 
VcAl reversed, ' denying any entitlement to further fees . 1 It 
said that EAHCA is a comprehensive statute~ stablishing substan-
tive educational rights for handicapped children and detailed 
remedial procedures, including private rights of action. The 
singular omission of any provision for attorney's fees cannot be 
rectified by recourse to the more general §1988 or the Rehabili-
tation Act. With regard to §1988, CAl cited Hymes v. Harnett 
✓ 
Cty. Bd. of Ed., 664 F.2d 410 (CA4 1981}; Anderson v. Thompson, 
658 F.2d 1205 (e A7 1981}. But see Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 
1164 (CA8 1982}; Hastings v. Maine-Endwell Sch. Dist., 676 F.2d 
893 (CA2 1982}; Robert M. v. Benton, 671 F.2d 1104 (CA8 1982}; 
Jose P. v. Ambach, 669 F.2d 865 (CA2 1982}. CAl found support 
for its §1988 holding in ~ dlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Sea 
~ 
Clammers Assn. , 453 US 1, 20 (1981} , in which this Court held 
that "[w] hen the remedial devices provided in a particular Act 
are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to preclude the 
remedy of suits under §1983." CAl limited its holding to cases 
1cAl did not reach the other questions presented by the state, 
including whether petrs were entitled to fees for work before the 
state agencies and state court. 
C: 
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in which the constitutional claims asserted under §1983 arise 
from the same factual underpinnings as the statutory claims under 
EAHCA. Here, that is the case. In fact, part of the purpose of 
the EAHCA was to enable states to fulfill their constitutional 
obligations to handicapped children. The denial of fees under 
the Rehabilitation Act is based on substantially the same reasons 
as those justifying the rejection of fees under §1988. This con-
clusion is epecially appropriate where the existence of a private 
right of action under the Rehabilitation Act is in doubt. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs assert that CAl's decision con-
flicts with the legislative history of §1988 and of the Rehabili-
tat ion Act. The House Report on §1988 expressly allows fees 
where a substantial constitutional question is not addressed by 
the court: 
In some instances, however, the claim with fees may 
involve a constitutional question which the courts are 
reluctant to resolve if the non-constitutional claim is 
dispositive ••.. In such cases, if the claim for which 
fees may be awarded meets the "substantiali ty" test, 
see Hagans v. Lavine, [415 US 528 (1974} ,] ••• attor-
ney's fees may be allowed even though the court de-
clines to enter judgment for the plaintiff on that 
claim, so long as the plaintiff prevails on the non-fee 
claim arising out of a "common nucleus of operative 
fact." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, [ 383 us 715, 725 
(1966}]. 
The legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act, which is 
worded identically to §1988, expressly incorporated the legisla-
tive history of the latter section. 
Petrs also assert that CAl's decision conflicts with Maher v. 
Gagne, 448 US 122, 128 n .10 (1980} , which held that petr could 
recover attorney's fees even though her success was based solely 
. ~o. 82-2120 - - page 5. 
on the Social Security Act, since her constitutional claims were 
sufficiently substantial to support federal jurisdiction, citing 
the quoted legislative history. Sea Clammers is distinguishable 
because that concerned the assertion of a federal statutory right 
through §1983, while here and in the Maher footnote the question 
is whether the assertion of a federal constitutional right 
through §1983 is precluded by the comprehensiveness of the EAHCA. 
Finally, petrs assert that CAl's decision conflicts with de-
cisions of CA8 and CA2 that hold that when a plaintiff prevails 
under EAHCA so that factually identical §1983 claims based on the 
Constitution are not reached, attorney's fees may still be award-
ed under §1988. Monahan; Benton; Ambach. Petrs say that Hymes, 
the CA4 case ci tea by CAl, rested on a finding that the EAHCA 
does not fall within the "and laws" language of §1983, so it does 
not give rise to a §1983 claim. In the present case, petrs never 
asserted that their EAHCA action was a §1983 claim, but rest 
their claim for attorney's fees on the existence of substantial 
constitutional claims alleged through §1983. Hymes also con-
flicts with Hensley v. Eckerhart, 51 USLW 4552, 4555 (US 5/15/83) 
(time spent by attorney on unsuccessful contentions related to 
the ones adopted by the court should not be subtracted in comput-
ing fee), in that CA4 awarded fees for time expended on a due 
process claim, while denying fees for time spent on the EAHCA 
claim. 
Petrs request either summary reversal or plenary review and 
reversal. 
-~ No. 82-2120 - - page 6. 
4. DISCUSSION: On the question of whether EAHCA is so 
q, nJ ts 't fus fov-
comprehensive as to preclude " identical constitutional claims \ 
brought through §1983, the 
0
c_lrc ~it_ spli ~ as br~ i-
ther ~ Al or petrs say. The CA2 cases do not raise the question 
because there plaintiffs explicitly prevailed under either the 
Rehabilitation Act or a §1983 due process claim, both of which 
allow attorney's fee awards. As petrs assert, the CA4 case ap-
pears to deal with whether an EAHCA claim can be brought through 
§1983, not with whether a constitutional claim can be brought 
1 C lC 
through §1983. Nevertheless, there is a clear conflict between 
CAl' s decision here and the two CA8 cases cited, Benton and 
Monahan. Those cases held that constitutional claims subs tan-
tially identical to the EAHCA claims on which plaintiffs pre-
vailed could provide the basis for attorney's fees. 
h . . b . v T 1s case also 1s a reasona ly important sequel to Sea 
Clammers. That case held that a comprehensive statute could pre-
clude bringing a statutory claim under §1983. This case raises 
the question whether such a statute precludes bringing a substan-
tially identical constitutional claim under §1983. It appears 
- w= -
.. 
that the EAHCA will probably fulfill the predicate requirement of 
comprehensiveness. No circuit has held otherwise, apparently; l 
CA8 left the question undecided and CA4 and CA7 agree with CAl 
that an EAHCA claim cannot be brought through §1983. 
In light of the legislative history of §1988 cited by petrs, 
and acknowledged by both the majority and concurrence in Maher, 
448 US at 132 n .15, 134, it may be that this case is obvious 
enough for summary reversal. Nevertheless, there is language in 
.,~o. 82-2120 - - page 7. 
Sea Clammers that suggests CAl's result. Also, I suspect that 
the importance of the question justifies plenary review. 
There is in addition the question whether the EAHCA precludes 
awarding attorney's fees where the plaintiff has raised 
unaddressed claims under the Rehabilitation Act. Because the 
§1988 legislative history was incorporated into the Rehabilita-
tion Act, this issue appears little different from the §1988 
question, though less significant. CAl is apparently the first 
court to confront the interaction of the EAHCA and the Rehabili-
tation Act. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend CPR with an eye to 
granting. 
There is no response. 
August 12, 1983 Neuhaus Opin in petn 
---
• 
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The response has been received in this case. It adds nothing 
}1 ~eA/·~ 
new. It consists of an extended quotation from a D. el. opinion 
------ "-I:-~ , 
in which the DC exercised discretion ~ r ~ 8 o deny fees, 
:)-<A~-~~.£..- ---L-
and several extended quotations from CAl~ op1n1on tn tht's case. 
In addition, petr has filed a supplemental brief to inform 
the Court of a CAS decision that conflicts with CAl's dep ision in 
the case at bar~ The court in ~ - Besteiro, 708 F.2d 1002, 
1006-1010 (CAS 1983), explicitly rejected the holding in this --case. Although CAS appears to have mistakenly thought CAl's case 
---;? 
involved a , 1983 suit brought to remedy a violation of the EAHCA 
itself, rather than to remedy an independent constitutional vio-
lation, the two decisions are squarely in conflict. CAS relied 
on the rule that Bivens actions will be deemed to be preempted by 
only where "Congress has provided an alternative remedy -explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery di-
under the Cons ti tut ion and viewed as equally effective, 11 
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980) (emphasis in origi-
thought this rule had even greater force where the 
implied, but is expressly provided 
Finding no express evidence in the EAHCA of an intent 
__,/ 
• 
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to displace j 1983 actions, CAS granted attorney's fees under ----- -f 1988. address your opinion 
I find this a difficult: is how explicit 
Congress must be in enacting specific statutory remedies in order 
to preclude a f 1983 action to enforce a similar or identical 
right. Sea Clammers held that when the j 1983 action is based on -the specific statute itself, a preemptive intent will be inferred 
merely i.rom the comprehensiveness of the remedies provided in 
tliut ~t.2.tutL. ~~- ~i:.:: .. . l . - . ..c.. ... ::..uc.1 c::..ir.:,1c1E..n::.!.v1;.LCSl:. !"--L'S & _cs1:.., 
lative awareness of the constitutional rights involve C, see 70: 
F.2d, at 8 (EAHCA intended to enable states to fulfill their con-
stitutional obligations to handicapped), sufficed to show an in-
tent to supplant j l983 actions to enforce identical constitution-
al rights. CAS thought such an intent could be inferred only 
from an explicit statutory provision. (CA8 agrees with the CAS's 
result, but its pre-Smith cases do not address whether EAHCA was 
intended to repeal f 1983 by implication.) The question is an 
important and open one as to which the CAs are in conflict. 
It may be argued that the fact that the relief on the merits 
was granted formally on the basis of state law will be a problem, 
either because of the Eleventh Amendment or because f 1988 does 
not allow fees where relief was actually granted on state-law 
grounds. (1) With respect to the Eleventh Amendment, I cannot 
tell from the papers whether relief was granted only against 
local officials (ordering them to pay for Tommy's education) or 
also against state officials (the local decision was upheld by 
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now sought). If the former, then the Eleventh Amendment does not 
apply. In any event, the ~ udgment on the merits is now final, -having been affirmed by CAl without cert. being sought, so that 
Pennhurst cannot affect it. The award of attorney's fees pursu-
ant to a federal statute should not raise an Eleventh Amendment 
problem by itself. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-698 
(1978). (2) There should be no problem under { 1988 in granting 
fees where the relief was based on state law. The legislative 
history of j l988 does not suggest any such limitation on awarding 
fees where relief was actually granted under a nonfee statute. 
In fact, the House report invokes the Gibbs tests of pendent ju-
risdiction over state-law claims to decide whether the nonfee 
claim and the cf 1983 claim are closely related. The theory of 
allowing fees in such cases is based on the doctrine of avoiding 
constitutional questions, which applies with equal force {in the 
absence of an Eleventh Amendment problem) when the alternative 
law is state law as it does when the law is federal. Since I 
doubt that either of these will be a problem, I recommend a --G~ 
Joe 
,. - -
March 26, 1984 
SMITH GINA-POW 
82-2120 Smith v. Robinson 
This is a summary memorandum merely to reflect my 
recollection as to what this case is "about". 
The petitioners are a handicapped child and his 
parents. He had been enrolled in an institution in Rhode 
Island that the parties agree provide him with an 
appropriate education (The "Bradley" Hospital/School). 
The local school board ( "Columbia School Committee") 
stopped paying the child's tuition because it believed the 
Rhode Island Department of Mental Health was required to 
do it. This suit was instituted in USDC charging a 
violation of the Cons ti tut ion, the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, and particularly the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act (the "Handicappped Act"). 
After issuing a preliminary injunction to permit 
exhaustion of administrative remedies within the state, 
the DC certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court the 
question of which state agency was responsible for paying 
for the child's education as required by the Handicapped 
Act. The State Supreme Court ruled that the School 
,,. 
• 
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Committee was responsible under state law - not the state 
agency. 
The District Court then found that the plaintiffs 
below (petitioners here) had, according to CAl's opinion: 
"Won all that they sought under state law" and accordingly 
it granted a permanent injunction. The DC' s action was 
affirmed by CAl, and all that remains in this case is 
petitioners claim for attorneys fees. The DC awarded fees 
under §1988 for the attorneys work on the "state claim". 
CAl reversed, holding that §1988 was not applicable. 
In an unanimous opinion written by Chief Judge 
Campbell, CAl said: 
"ultimately it was to the EAHCA that the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court looked in determining 
that state law required the school committee to 
fund Thomas 's placement at Bradley. R. r. 415 
A.2d, at 172. Not only was EAHCA the foundation 
of plaintiffs' victory, its provisions 
encompassed all the relief for which plaintiffs 
now seek attorneys' fees, i.e., all relief 
beyond the preliminary injunction. See footnote 
3, infra. 
Yet while EAHCA provides expressly for the 
bringing of private enforcement actions such as 
this one, 20 u.s.c. ,11415(e), it contains no 
provision for attorneys' fees." 





"But even if plaintiffs' section 1983 
claims qualify as 'substantial,' we do not think 
that fact alone created authority for fees in a 
case bottomed so completely on an encompassing 
federal statute that does not authorize fees. 
Alyeska makes clear that it is for Congress, not 
the courts, to pick and choose among types of 
actions warranting fees. 421 U.S. at 269, 95 S. 
Ct. at 1627. Thus the question before us 
remains one of finding affirmative congressional 
sanction for fees in this situation. We can 
find none." 
3 • 
The Court of Appeals also relied substantially on my 
opinion in Sea Clammers in which we stayed that "when the 
remedial devices provided in a particular act are 
sufficiently comprehensive, they will suffice to preclude 
the remedy of suits under §1983". al though Sea Clammer s 
was addressing the right to sue under §1983, and this case 
involves the right to imply attorneys' fees under §1988 
from the substantive rights provided by the Handicapped 
Act, CAl thought the same principles were involved. 
LFP, JR • 
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Cammie R. Robins Smith v. Robinson March 27, 1984 
Question Presented 
Whether §1988 authorizes an award of attorneys fees to a 
plaintiff who alleges constitutional claims under §1983, but who 
ultimately prevails exclusively under state law. 
- -
FACTS & DECISION BELOW 
The chronology of the litigation is somewhat important, 
but since it is set out fairly clearly in CAl's opinion, I will 
not repeat it here. 
DISCUSSION 
Plaintiffs claimed that denial of a free appropriate 
public education to their handicapped child violated rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution (Equal Protection; Due Process) 
and by f ~deral statute (the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act [EAHCA] and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act). 
Section 1983 provided a private right of action for the alleged 
constitutional violation; the EAHCA p rovided 
~~ction for the alleged statutory violation. 
provides for an award of attorneys fees for 
a private right of E,L//-/C/4 
Although §1988 4-1:°Lhwt 
the §1983 claim, no ~
-:i::. - --?<-D 
attorneys fees are authorized by the EAHCA. CAl (Cambell, J.) 
heldthat "where,~ here, the constitutional allegations arise 
from the same factual underpinnings as the statutory claims, 
§1988 does not apply." I think that the reasoning CAl used to 
reach its result is flawed in several respects. 
1. Although plaintiffs alleged no state claims, they 
prevailed on state law. The QC never reached the merits of -~ 
either the §1983 claim or the federal statutory claims. 1 Thus, 
-:::::-----




- - f~, 
it seems that the propriety of a fee award in this case depends Q 
on whether fees may be awarded under §1988 whe~ the party 
prevails on a pendent state claim for which no fees are provided. 
The legislative history of §1988 indicates that fees are 
appropriate in such a case as long as the §1983 claim "meets the 
~ ~b~s ~t ~a~n~t~i~a~l=i ~t ~Y-'- ~" of Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974), 
and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). H.R. Rep. 
No. 94-1558, p.4, n.7. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 132-133 
& n.15 (1980). Thus, the crucial question is whether the §1983 
claims were "substantial." CAl did not employ this analysis, nor 
fully resolve that issue. 
2. CAl's r ~ nce on Middlesex County Sewage Authority 
v. Sea C]ammers Association, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (JUSTICE POWELL), 
is misplaced. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), held that 
violation of federal statutory rights under color of state law 
will support a §1983 claim. 2 Sea Clammers established a 
limitation to that decision. It held that Congress is presumed 
to have precluded any right of action under §1983 to vindicate 
1There is arguably a ~ nnhurst problem here. The DC entered a 
permanent injunction on the basis of state law. However, it 
appears from the papers that the itJ unc:to; was entered ag ~inst 
the local school committee rather an a e o ffi cials and that 
the~hool c ommitte e wa s not~ rryi~ policy. See 
J.A., at 175. That may eliminate any Pennhurst problem. 
Moreover, there was a final judgment in this case before 
Pennhurst was handed down. Finally, there is not much briefing 
on this issue and it does not seem necessary to resolution of th 
fee question in the same way that the underlying issue was 
necessary to the fee question in Pulliam. Thus, I suggest that 
the Court not dwell on whatever Pennhurst problem exists. 









statutory rights created by a federal statute that provides its 
own comprehensive enforcement scheme. If Congress by enacting 
the EAHCA intended to preclude identical claims brought under 
§1983, §1988 would not provide for attorneys fees in this case. 
CAl, however, did not rely on Sea Clammers to hold that the EAHCA 
precluded plaintiffs' §1983 claims. 3 Instead, it relied on the 
rationale of Sea Clammers to hold that "the omission [of 
attorneys fees under the EAHCA] has the same preclusive effect 
with regard to section 1988 that the lack of a private remedy in 
[Sea Clammers] had with regard to section 1983." Cert. Pet. at 
A.14-15 (emphasis in original). 
'Ihis reasoning is flawed for two reasons: ( i) The EAHCA E Ir lfc /J. 
was enacted in 1975 -- one year before §1988 and before this 
../2.--n~~ 
/ o/ 7 i> -
Court handed down its opinion in Aleyska Pipeline Service Co. v. ~ 
5;9gg-Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). At the time of the 
enactment, courts were awarding attorneys fees liberally to 
private attorneys general. Congress well may have believed that 
attorneys fees would be available under the EAHCA without any 
express requirement. (I recognize that this is a weak argument in 
light of the Aleyska decision). 
(ii) More -
important, Congress in enacting §1988 made clear that where a 
plaintiff alleges both a §1983 claim and a pendent statutory - ----
3To the contrary, it expressly noted that Sea Clammers "may not 
logically preclude a section 1983 action for violation of the 




claim for which fees cannot be awarded, fees may be awarded 
Cll I 
' 
§1988 as long as the §1983 claim meets the "substantiality" test 
of Hagans and Gibbs. See H.R. Rep., supra; Maher, 448 U.S., at 
132-133 & n.15. CAl ignored this legislative history, and this 




3. Even under a proper application of Sea Clammers, it 
is not clear that plaintiffs' §1983 claims are precluded by the 
EAHCA. The §1983 claims at issue here are based on alleged 
constitutional violations. The §1983 claims at issue in Sea 
Clammers were based on alleged violations of a federal statute 
that had its own comprehensive enforcement scheme. The principle 
of Sea Clammers is that Congress may create a federal statutory 
right without at the same time creating a right of action under 
§1983. If Congress has provided a comprehensive scheme for the 
enforcement of these new statutory rights, the Court will presume 
that Congress did not intend also to provide a right of action 
under §1983. Where, as here, the §1983 claims are based on 
alleged constitutional violations, the Sea Clammers principle may 
not be applicable. 
In passing §1983, Congress provided a private right of 
action for constitutional violations committed under color of 
state law. A subsequent statutory scheme may protect the same 
rights and provide a comprehensive scheme for enforcing any 
statutory violations without precluding §1983 claims. Cf. 
Johnson v. Railway Express, 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (Title VII does 




the §1983 claim, this Court must presume that Congress intended 
the new statute partially to repeal §1983. Such repeals by 
implication are disfavored, as this Court expressly held in 
V carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980). 4 When §1983 claims 
are based on alleged constitutional violations, it is Carlson 
rather than Sea Clammers that seems to control. Under Carlson, 
there is no reason to believe that Congress intended the EAHCA to 
preclude plaintiffs' §1983 claims. (I have not checked to see if /)1.,)b-
there is a more recent statement than Carlson. There may be one 
from last term. I will check.). 
If the EAHCA does not preclude plaintiffs' §1983 claims, 
it is necessary under Maher to determine whether the 
constitutional claims meet the "substantiality" test of Gibbs. 
- ::.:> 
Although CAl did not attempt such an analysis for purposes of 
determining the propriety of a fee award, it did make the 
following offhand remark: "[P]laintiffs' section 1983 claims were 
arguably 'substantial' in that, though weak, they would at least 
have supported federal jurisdiction." Cert. App., at A.10. 
Arguably this establishes the propriety of the fee award under 
Maher. Because this comment was more offhanded dicta than well-
reasoned analysis, I recommend that the Court conduct its own 
4carlson provided that the §1983 claim is eliminated only "when a ~ 
defendants show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy ~~ 
which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery 
directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective 
as Bivens." 446 U.S., at 181-19. You objected to this statement 
in your separate concurrence. 446 U.S., at 26-27. 
fl - -
"substantiality" analysis. ~ 
There are several factors supporting a finding of~~ 
"substantiality." ~ 
1. The constitutional claims were substantial enoug~ 
secure a preliminary injunction. 5 
2. At least one DC before passage of the EAHCA had held tha 
the Equal Protection Clause required school districts to provid 
special education to handicapped children. Mills v. Board of 
Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
3. The legislative history of the EAHCA makes clear that 
Congress enacted the legislation to help states fulfill what 





appropriate education to handicapped children. The legislative 
history expressly referred to the Mills case and to this Court's 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 348 U.S. 886 (1954), as 
establishing such a constitutional obligation. 6 Of course, 
Congress is not the arbiter of constitutional rights, but the 
constitutional claims asserted here have found at least some 
support. 
There are several factors that cut against a finding of 
5By agreement among the parties, attorneys fees were awarded to 
plaintiffs in connection with that preliminary injunction. 
6The legislative history quoted the following passage from 
Brown as support: "In these days, it is doubtful that any child 
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity ••• is a right 
which must be made available to all on equal terms." S. Rep. No. 




1. Gibbs provides the test for "substantiality." At one 
point in Gibbs, the Court indicated that the test is not met if 
"the federal issues were so remote or played such a minor role 
••. that in effect only the state claim was tried." 383 U.S., at 
728. Here, the §1983 claims arguably were remote and played a 
minor (to say the least) role in the case after the preliminary 
injunction stage. As far as I can tell from the Appendix, the -
constitutional $ aims were never discussed after the preliminary 
injunction. All the debate and discussion centered on the state 
law questions as they were resolved in light of the EAHCA. While 
both state law and the EAHCA played a substantial role in the 
relief awarded here, the §1983 claims played absolutely none L If 
they were litigated at all, they certainly were not resolved. 
2. One might argue that an Equal Protection claim is not 
substantial here because handicapped children and non-handicapped 
children are not similarly situated. 7 
I find this an extremely close case. I tentatively 
recommend that the Court affirm the result reached by CAl. As 
long as the preliminary injunction stage is considered separately 
from the rest of the litigation, and fees are awarded for that 
stage, it seems that the §1983 claims virtually dropped out of 
.... ___________________ - - -------------
the litigation thereafter. Although those claims certainly were 
7This is a harsh an unattractive 
accurate at some point. ' 





substantial enough to support federal jurisdiction, that will be 
true in almost any case. The Court may want to announce a rule 
that §1983 claims will not be considered "substantial" for 
purposes of a fee award if they were never legitimately litigated 
on the merits. This may conflict, however, with the legislative 
history, which indicates that Congress intended to apply the 
"substantiality" test of Gibbs. 8 
8 r think the question whether attorneys fees may be awarded on 
the basis of the §504 claim is much easier. As far as I can 
tell, that claim played eve7f7:ess or a role in the litigation 
than the §1983 claims. Because there is no legislative history 
on the Rehabilitation Act suggesting that Congress intended 
courts to award attorneys fees merely because §504 claims were 
"substantial," I think 1t is clear that no fees are available 




SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMO 
/~9~-~J-. 
RE: Smith v. Robinson, No. 82-2120 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Cammie 
-
Having done this bench memo so hurriedly, I thought it 
best to check a few things. I have found some items worth adding 
and some worth correcting . 
After reviewing the issues once again, I am more con-
I( ,. 
vinced that CAl's result was correct. The chronology of the lit-
igation suggests to me that the Equal Protection claim asserted ~ 
under §1983 and the Rehabilitation claim were added merely for ~,£.L.u.( 
the purpose of securing attorneys fees. Thus, I think the chro-
nology is worth setting out. 
In Nov. 1976, plaintiffs filed a complaint under §1983 
in DC claiming that the local school committee had violated Due 
Process by terminating Tommy's special education before the corn-
pletion of state administrative proceedings. It was this due 
process claim that secured the prel irninary injunction. Plain---
tiffs have received attorneys fees for all work done in connec-
~ -
tion with that issue. 
The administrative review was completed in April 1978 
and the Rhode Island Commissioner of Education issued a written 
opinion holding that the Mental Heal th, Retardation Hospitals 
[MHRH] rather than the local school committee had the responsi-
• 
- -
bility for providing Tommy's special education. This meant that 
the education would not be provided completely free of charge. 
~ ~..l>C 
In May 1978, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint 
alleging that the administrative review process that had been 
used violated Due Process and various provisions of the EAHCA. 
They also claimed that the denial of a free special education 
violated the EAHCA. ~ ~ 
/ .. ~
In January 1979, the DC certified two questions to the ~-
Rhode Island Supreme Court. Both questions sought to determine 
whether, under state law, the local school committee or the MHRH 
had responsibility for providing Tommy's special education. If 
state law required the local school committee to provide that 
education, there would be no need to address the federal statu-
tory or constitutional questi;ns. 1 - __......___ 
In June 1980, the state court held that under state law 14.,l-
u--~ 
the local school committee was responsible for providing the spe- lo/SO 
cial Promptly thereafter, in Sept. -~~ 
1980, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint ad~ the ~ 
education at issue here. 
~ --------------- __, Equal Protection claim under §1983 and the Rehabi li tat ion claim ~ 
~-
under §504. Because resolution of the state law questions al- L J _ 
1 -------~ '------~--~-...... ---~-- ~~
ready had provided plaintiffs with a ~ the &;;~-thets, sou2_ht, ·cps--
this second amended complaint seems to have been an obvious ploy ~ 
------- -- - - /"'!f8~ -,,.~#!'cd 
1All parties agreed that if the local school committee were 
responsible for providing the education, it would be provided to 
w Tommy completely free of charge. If, on the other hand, the MHRH 
~ responsible for providing the education, it would not be 
completely free of charge under state law, thereby making 
resolution of the federal issues necessary • 
~ 
- -
• to obtain attorneys fees under §1988 and the Rehabilitation Act. 
• 
In Jan. 1981, the DC held explicitly what was made so 
......... _____.. r' I 
obvious by the state court's decision -- plaintiffs had secured 
all requested relief under state law and therefore resolution of 
the federal issues was unnecessary. 
The DC nevertheless awarded attorneys fees to plaintiffs 
under §1988 and the Rehabilitation Act because "substantial" 
claims under §1983 and §504 had been alleged. Although, I do 
not agree with CAl's reasoning, I now think it is clear that no 
such fee award should be made in this case. I think that the 
Court can easily conclude that the Equal Protection claim and the ~----- ··-
§504 claim were not "substantial" in this case because they ap--- w--
peared only after it was clear that relief would be granted on 
the basis of state law. The due process claim that was alleged 
from the outset is more troubling. I would argue that it was not 
"substantial" in this case because it was never actually litigat-
ed and played absolutely no role in the relief granted here. 
As for corrections, I referred to Carlson v. Green in 
the bench memo as if it were a §1983 case. It is not. It is a 
~ Bivens case. Carlson, therefore, is relevant only by analogy. 
The point is that a subsequent statute may preclude §1983 claims 
based on alleged constitutional violations only if Congress in-
tended that statute partially to repeal §1983 by implication. No 
such repeal by implication was necessary to the decision in Sea 
Clammers. 
Finally, the Court last term decided a case that seems 
to have modified the language you objected to in Carlson. In - ------~\ '-~ 
-
---- ---- - -- - ··--- r -·- -
- -
Bush v. Lucas, 103 s.ct. 2404, 2411 (1983), the Court held that 
"[w]hen Congress provides an alternative remedy, it may, of 
cnurse, indicate its intent [to preclude a Bivens action] , by 
statutory language, by clear legislative history, or perhaps even 
by the statutory remedy itself." Because CAl did not address the 
issue, and I have not reviewed the statutory scheme set forth by 
the EAHCA, I am not certain whether that statute is so comprehen-
sive that it indicates an intent on the part of Congress to pre-
clude constitutional claims under §1983. A remand to CAl to ad-
dress this issue might be appropriate. However, if a fee award 
would be inappropriate in any event, as I think it would be, a 
remand would be wasteful. 
Recommendation - I recommend that the Court hold that no fee 
award may be made under §1988 because the §1983 claims were not ·-"substantial," and that no fee award be made under the Rehabili-
.....,__ ~ ,. 
tation Act because plaintiffs did not prevail on their §504 
claim • 
- -
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ABSENT NOT VOTING 
-err 03/29/84 
March 29, 1984 
RE: No. 82-2120, Smith v. Robinson 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM : Cammie 
-
You requested a brief memo on the §1983 due process 
claim. 
After plaintiffs had lost in state administrative pro-
ceedings, they filed their "First Amended Complaint" (May 10, 
1978) (J.A., at 49). This complaint alleged two claims -- a due 
process claim under §1983 and a claim for free appropriate educa-
tion under the EAHCA. 
l ~f3 
The "due process claim was purely procedural. Plain-
tiffs claimed that the state proceedings had violated due process 
by denying them an impartial hearing officer. As relief, plain-
tiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the administrative pro-
ceedings were unconstitutional, 1 and a "prohibitory injunction 
against the Commissioner and the Associate Commissioner conduct-
ing any more [such) hearings" without conforming them to the pro-
1Plaintiffs also sought a declaration that the state procedure 
violated the procedural requirements of the EAHCA. The EAHCA 
claim, of course, would not support a claim for attorneys fees. 
- - page 2. 
cedural requirements of the EAHCA. J.A., at 60. 2 The EAHCA claim 
was purely substantive. Plaintiffs claimed that the state agen-
cy's decision violated their federal statutory right to have the 
local school committee provide a free appropriate education to 
Tommy. As relief, they sought an injunction compelling the local 
school committee to provide that education. Thus, the due proc-
ess claim and the EAHCA claim were two distinctly different -
claims, based on different legal theories, and seeking separate 
types of relief. Although plaintiffs prevailed on the EAHCA , 
claim 3 and obtained all the relief they had requested in that 
regard, the DC never ruled on their due process claim, and plain-
tiffs obtained none of the relief requested under that count. 
There seems to be little reason, therefore, why plaintiffs should 
recover attorneys fees under §1988 for their success under the 
EAHCA merely because they included this separate §1983 claim in 
2This request for relief seems odd. Plaintiffs had completed 
the administrative process, and there is no indication that they 
would be subjected to it in the future. They have not argued 
that the DC should declare the administrative process 
unconstitutional and then order the state agency to reconsider 
their substantive claim under different procedures. What they 
want is a decision by a federal court that they are entitled to 
the educational opportunities the state has denied them. I 
simply do not understand why plaintiffs sought the relief 
requested. Moreover, in view of the requested relief, the EAHCA 
may have mooted the due process claim. The EAHCA, effective only 
after these proceedings were complete, imposes detailed 
procedural requirements on states accepting funding under the Act 
and has made the procedures used in those proceedings obsolete. 
3For purposes of a fee award, I think it is fair to say that 
plaintiffs prevailed on their EAHCA claim even though it was 
state rather than federal law that provided the basis for their 
relief. 
- - page 3. 
their complaint. 
I think reliance on Maher to support this result is mis-
placed. Relying on a passage in the legislative history, Maher 
held that fees may be awarded under §1988 where a plaintiff "pre-
va i ls on a wholly statutory, non-civil-rights claim pendent to a 
substantial constitutional claim" that is never adjudicated. The 
relevant passage in the legislative history provided: 
"In some instances, ••• the claim with fees may involve 
a constitutional question which the courts are reluc-
tant to resolve if the non-constitutional claim is dis-
positive. • • . In such cases, if the claim for which 
fees may be awarded meets the 'substantiali ty' test, 
see Hagans v. Lavine; United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, ••• 
attorney's fees may be allowed even though the court 
declines to enter judgment for the plaintiff on that 
claim, so long as the plaintiff prevails on the non-fee 
claim arising out of a 'common nucleus of operative 
fact.'" H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p.4, n.7 (emphasis 
added) • 
The italicized phrase in this passage seems to indicate 
that plaintiffs who prevail on non-fee claims may recover attor-
ney's fees under §1988 only if their pendant §1983 claims might 
have provided alternate grounds for obtaining the same relief 
ob tained under the non-fee claims. It would make little sense to 
apply the Gibbs "substantiali ty" test to a §1983 claim that is 
entirely separate from the claim under which plaintiff prevailed. 
Language in Hensley is inst r uctive on this point. There 
the Court stated: 
"In some cases a plaintiff may present in one law-
suit distinctly different claims for relief that are 
based on different facts and legal theories. In such a 
suit, even where the claims are brought against the 
same defendants ••. , counsel's work on one claim will 
be unrelated to his wort on another claim. Accoraing-
ly, worl< on an unsuccessful c l a1.m cannot be deemed to 
have been 'expended in pursuit of the ultimate result 
achieved.' •.• The congressional intent to limit 
page 4. 
awards to prevailing parties requires that these unre-
lated claims be treated as if they had been raised in 
separate lawsuits, and therefore no fee may be awarded 
for services on the unsuccessful claim." Hensley, 103 
s.ct., at 1940 (emphasis added). 
The EAHCA claim and the due process claim alleged here should be 
treated as if they were raised in separate lawsuits. Where a 
non-fee claim and a §1983 claim are completely separate, success 
on the non-fee claim should not su~port an award of attorneys 
fees under §1988 no matter how subs'tantial the §1983 claim. 
Maher applies only where the non-fee claim and the §1983 claim 
are mere subs ti tues for one another and seek the same relief. 
Such is not the case here. 4 
4The equal protection claim, on the other hand, is precisely 
this type of claim. There are two ways of dealing with that 
claim. The first is to say that it is not "substantial." The 
second, and I think preferable way, is to say that a §1983 claim 
that is alleged only after success on alternate grounds is clear 
will not support an award of attorneys fees no matter how 
sub~tantial. This will avoid making a quasi constitutional 
ruling, and it also will ~ help stop an abusive practice of 
adding claims merely to secure a fee award. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-2120 
THOMAS F. SMITH, JR., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
WILLIAM P. ROBINSON, JR., RHODE ISLAND 
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER OF 
EDUCATION ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST cmcUIT 
[June -, 1984) 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents questions regarding the award of attor-
ney's fees in a proceeding to secure a ''free appropriate public 
education" for a handicapped child. At various stages in the 
proceeding, petitioners asserted claims for relief based on 
state law, on the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), 
84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U. S. C. §§ 1400 et seq., on §504 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 
29 U. S. C. § 794, and on the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit concluded that because the proceeding, 
in essence, was one to enforce the provisions of the EHA, a 
statute that does not provide for the payment of attorney's 
fees, petitioners were not entitled to such fees. Smith v. 
Cumberland School Committee, 703 F. 2d 4 (1983). Peti-
tioners insist that this Court's decision in Maher v. Gagne, 
448 U. S. 122 (1980), compels a different conclusion. 
I 
The procedural history of the case is complicated, but it is 
significant to the resolution of the issues. Petitioner Thomas 
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-
riety of physical and emotional handicaps. When this pro-
ceeding began in November 1976, Tommy was 8 years old. 
In the preceding December, the Cumberland School Commit-
tee had agreed to place Tommy in a day program at Emma 
Pendleton Bradley Hospital in East Providence, R. I., and 
Tommy began attending that program. In November 1976, 
however, the Superintendent of Schools informed Tommy's 
parents, who are the other petitioners here, that the School 
Committee no longer would fund Tommy's placement be-
cause, as it construed Rhode Island law, the responsibility 
for educating an emotionally disturbed child lay with the 
State's Division of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals 
[MHRHJ. App. 25-26. 
Petitioners took an appeal from the decision of the Superin-
tendent to the School Committee. In addition, petitioners 
filed a complaint under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in the United 
States District Court for the District of Rhode Island against 
the members of the School Committee, asserting that due 
process required that the Committee comply with "Article 
IX-Procedural Safeguards" of the Regulations adopted by 
the State Board of Regents regarding Education of Handi-
capped Children [Regulations] 1 and that Tommy's placement 
1 In November 1976, Rhode Island, through its Board of Regents for 
Education, was in the process of promulgating new regulations concerning 
the education of handicapped children. The old regulations, approved in 
1963, had been issued by the State Department of Education and were en-
titled "Regulations-Education of Handicapped Children." Most of the 
new Regulations became effective October 1, 1977. Article IX of Section 
One, however, was made effective June 14, 1976. See Section One, Art. 
XII. 
The Regulations were promulgated pursuant to R. I. Gen. Laws 
§ 1~24-2 (1981). The immediately preceding section, § 1~24-1, sets out 
the duty of the local school committee to provide, for a child, "who is either 
mentally retarded or physically or emotionally handicapped to such an ex-
tent that normal educational growth and development is prevented," such 
type of special education "that will best satisfy the needs of the handi-
capped child, as recommended and approved by the board of regents for 
education in accordance with its regulations. " Section 1~24-1 has its ori-
-
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3 
in his program be continued pending appeal of the Superin-
tendent's decision. 
In orders issued in December 1976 and January 1977, the 
District Court entered a temporary restraining order and 
then a preliminary injunction. The court agreed with peti-
tioners that the Regulations required the School Committee 
to continue Tommy in his placement at Bradley Hospital 
pending appeal of the Superintendent's decision. The School 
Committee's failure to follow the Regulations, the court con-
cluded, would constitute a deprivation of due process. 
On May 10, 1978, petitioners filed a First Amended Com-
plaint. App. 49. By that time, petitioners had completed 
the state administrative process. They had appealed the Su-
perintendent's decision to the School Committee and then to 
the State Commissioner of Education, who delegated respon-
sibility for conducting a hearing to an Associate Commis-
sioner of Education. Petitioners had moved that the Associ-
ate Commissioner recuse himself from conducting the review 
of the School Committee's decision, since he was an employee 
of the State Educational Agency and therefore not an impar-
tial hearing officer. The Associate Commissioner denied the 
motion to recuse. 
All the state officers agreed that, under R. I. Gen. Laws, 
Tit. 40, ch. 7 (1977), the responsibility for educating Tommy 
lay with MHRH. 2 The Associate Commissioner acknowl-
edged petitioners' argument that since §40.1-7-8 would re-
quire them to pay a portion of the cost of services provided to 
Tommy,3 the statute conflicted with the EHA, but concluded 
gin in 1952 R. I. Pub. Laws, ch. 2905, § 1, and was in effect in November 
1976. 
2 Under§ 40.1-7-3, enacted by 1971 R. I. Pub. Laws, ch. 89, art. 1, § 1, 
MHRH is charged "with the responsibility to promote the development of 
specialized services for the care and treatment of emotionally disturbed 
children and to cooperate to this end with all reputable agencies of a public 
or private character serving such children .... " 
3 Section 40.1-7-8 provides: "The parents of children in the program, 




SMITH v. ROBINSON 
-
that the problem was not within his jurisdiction to resolve. 
In their First Amended Complaint, petitioners added as 
defendants the Commissioner of Education, the Associate 
Commissioner of Education, the Board of Regents for Educa-
tion, and the Director of MHRH. They also specifically re-
lied for the first time on the EHA, noting that at all times 
mentioned in the complaint, the State of Rhode Island had 
submitted a plan for state-administered programs of special 
education and related services and had received federal funds 
pursuant to the EHA. 4 
In the First Count of their Amended Complaint, petition-
ers challenged the fact that both the hearing before the 
School Committee and the hearing before the Associate Com-
missioner were conducted before examiners who were em-
ployees of the local or state education agency. They sought 
a declaratory judgment that the procedural safeguards con-
tained in Article IX of the Regulations did not comply with 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or 
with the requirements of the EHA, 20 U. S. C. § 1415, and 
its accompanying regulations. They also sought an injunc-
tion prohibiting the Commissioner and Associate Commis-
costs of the care and treatment of their children in accordance with regula-
tions to be promulgated by the director." 
'The 1975 Amendment to the EHA, on which petitioners rely, became 
effective October 1, 1977. Prior to that date, the federal requirements 
governing States which, like Rhode Island, submitted state plans and re-
ceived federal money for the education of handicapped children were found 
in the Education of the Handicapped Act, 84 Stat. 175, as amended in 1974, 
88 Stat. 579. The obligations imposed on a State by that Act were to ex-
pend federal money on programs designed to benefit handicapped children. 
From August 1974 to September 30, 1977, the Act also required that par-
ents be given minimal due process protections when the State proposed to 
change the educational placement of the child. 88 Stat. 582. The state 
hearing process in this case began on January 20, 1977, with a hearing be-
fore the School Committee. By the time petitioners' appeal progressed to 
the Associate Commissioner of Education on November 2, 1977, the 1975 
Act was in effect. Unless otherwise indicated, future references to the 
"EHA" refer to the 1975 amendments to that Act. 
-
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sioner from conducting any more hearings in review of deci-
sions of the Rhode Island local education agencies (LEAs) 
unless and until the Board of Regents adopted regulations 
that conformed to the requirements of § 1415 and its regula-
tions. Finally, they sought reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs. 
In the Second Count of their Amended Complaint, petition-
ers challenged the substance of the Associate Commissioner's 
decision. In their view, the decision violated Tommy's 
rights "under federal and state law to have his LEA provide 
a free, appropriate educational placement without regard to 
whether or not said placement can be made within the local 
school system." App. 61. They sought both a declaratory 
judgment that the School Committee, not MHRH, was re-
sponsible for providing Tommy a free appropriate education, 
and an injunction requiring the School Committee to provide 
Tommy such an education. They also asked for reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs. 
On December 22, 1978, the District Court issued an opinion 
acknowledging confusion over whether, as a matter of state 
law, the School Committee or MHRH was responsible for 
funding and providing the necessary services for Tommy. 
App. 108. The court also noted that if the Associate Com-
missioner were correct that Tommy's education was gov-
erned by §40.1-7, the state scheme would appear to be in 
conflict with the requirements of the EHA, since §40.1-7 
may require parental contribution and may not require 
MHRH to provide education at all if it would cause the De-
partment to incur a deficit. At the request of the state de-
fendants, the District Court certified to the Supreme urt 
of Rhode Island the state law uestions whether the school 
committee was reqmre to provi e special education for a 
resident handicapped student if the local educational pro-
grams were inadequate, and whether the cost of such pro-
grams was the responsibility of the local school committee or 
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On May 29, 1979, the District Court granted partial sum-
mary judgment for the defendants on petitioners' claim that 
they were denied due process by the requirement of the 
Regulations that they submit their dispute to the School 
Committee and by the Associate State Commissioner's re-
fusal to recuse himself. The court noted that the School 
Committee's members were not "employees" of the local edu-
cation agency, but elected officials, and determined that the 
provision of the EHA directing that no hearing shall be con-
ducted by an employee of an agency or unit involved in the 
education or care of the child does not apply to hearings con-
ducted by the state education agency. 
On June 3, 1980, the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued 
an opinion answering the certified questions. Smith v. 
Cumberland School Committee, -- R. I.--, 415 A. 2d 
168. Noting the responsibility of the Board of Regents for 
Education to comply with the requirements of the EHA, the 
court determined that the primary obligation of financing a 
handicap_pe~ c~ecial e1 uca 10n a with the local School 
C~e. - What~ 1ga 10n 0.1- imposes on 
MHRH to provide educational services is limited and comple-
ments, rather than supplants, the obligations of School Com-
mittees under § 16.24-1. 
Petitioners thereafter filed their Second Amended and 
Supp~m>-.n_ta] Complaint. App. 152. Inittheyactded to 
Count TI cTafmslof ~ under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and under § 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 794. 
They also requested attorney's fees under 42 U. S. C. § 1988 
and what was then 31 U. S. C. § 1244(e) (1976 ed.). 5 
• By the time of the filing of petitioners' Second Amended Complaint on 
September 16, 1980, attorney's fees were available directly under the Re-
habilitation Act. See Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Devel-
opmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, § 120, 92 Stat. 2982, 29 
U. S. C. § 794a. Instead of relying on that statute, however, petitioners 
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On January 12, 1981, the District Court issued an order de-
claring petitioners' rights, entering a permanent injunction 
against the School Committee defendants, and approving an 
award of attorney's fees against those defendants. App. 
172. The court ordered the School Committee to pay the full 
cost of Tommy's attendance at Harmony Hill School, Tom-
my's then-current placement. By agreement between peti-
tioners and the School Committee and without prejudice to 
petitioners' claims against the other defendants, the court 
awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $8,000, pursuant to 
42 U. S. C. § 1988 and the then 31 U. S. C. § 1244 (e). 
On June 4, 1981, the District Court issued two orders, this 
time addressed to petitioners' cfarms against the state de-
fendants. In the first order, App. 177, the court denied the 
state defendants' motion to dismiss. In the second order, 
id., at 189, the court declared that Tommy is entitled to a 
free appropriate s ecial education ~ 
land Sc ool ommittee. he court note s · Tommy 
was~ef he sought as a atter of state la , it 
was unnecessary and improper for the court to go furt er and 
reach petitioners' federal statutory and constitutional claims. 
Petitioners were given 14 days to move for an award of fees. 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed in an 
unpublished per curiam opinion .tiled on January 11, 1982 . . 
It concluded that the Commissioner was not immune from in-
junctive relief and that petitioners' challenge to the District 
Court's award of summary judgment to respondents on their 
due process challenge was moot. 
Petitioners requested fees and costs against the state de-
fendants. Id., at 195. On April 30, 1982, the D1strict Court 
§ 6721(c)(2)), a statute that authorized a civil action to enforce § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act against any State or local ·government receiving federal 
funds under the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 
919, as amended by the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Amendments of 
1976, 90 Stat. 2341. Section § 1244(e) authorized an award of attorney's 
fees to a "prevailing party." 
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ruled orally that petitioners were entitled to fees and costs in 
the amount of $32,109 for the hours spent in the state admin-
istrative process both before and after the state defendants 
were named as parties to the federal litigation. App. to Pet. 
for Cert. A31-A58. Relying on New York Gaslight Club, 
Inc. v. Carey, 447 U. S. 54 (1980), and its own opinion in 
Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F. Supp. 577 (R. I. 1982), the court 
reasoned that because petitioners were required to exhaust 
their EHA remedies before bringing their § 1983 and § 504 
claims, they were entitled to fees for those procedures. The 
court agreed with respondents that petitioners were not enti-
tled to compensation for hours spent challenging the use of 
employees as hearing officers. No fees were awarded for 
hours spent obtaining the preliminary injunctive relief, as pe-
titioners already had been compensated for that work by the 
school committee defendants. Finally, the court rejected 
the defendants' argument that fees should not be allowed be-
cause this was an action under the EHA, which does not pro-
vide for fees. In the court's view,r espondents had given ..... in-
stifncient weight to the fact that petitioners had alleged equal 
protection and§ 1983 claims as well as the EHA claim. The 
court added that it found~ equal protection claim peti-
tioners included in their second amended complaint to be col-
orable and nonfrivolous. Petitioners thus were entitled to 
fees for prevailing in an action to enforce their § 1983 claim. 
The Court of Ap eals reversed. Smith v. Cumberland 
School Committee, 703 F. 2d 4 CAl 1983). The court first 
noted that, under what is labelled the "American Rule," at-
torney's fees are available as a general matter only when 
statutory authority so provides. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. 
Wilderness Society , 421 U. S. 240 (1975). Here the action 
and relief granted in this case fell within the reach of the 
EHA, a federal statute that establishes a comprehensive fed-
eral-state scheme for the provision of special education to 
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ney's fees. 6 For fees, the District Court had to look to 
§ 1988 and § 505 of the Rehabilitation Act. 
As to the § 1988 claim, the court acknowledged the general 
rule that when the claim upon which a plaintiff actually pre-
vails is accompanied by a "substantial," though undecided, 
§ 1983 claim arising from the same nucleus of facts, a fee 
award is appropriate. Maher v. GfJ{Jne, 448 U. S. 122, 
130-131 (1980). Here, petitioners' § 1983 claims arguably 
were at least substantial enough to support federal jurisdic- ; 
tion. Ibid. Even if the§ 1983 claims were substantial, how-
ever, the Court of Appeals concluded that, given the com-
prehensiveness of the EHA, Congress could not have 
intended its omission of attorney's fees relief to be rectified 
by recourse to § 1988. 
The Court of Appeals drew support for its conclusion from 
this Court's decision in Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. 
National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981). There 
the Court held that where Congress had provided compre-
hensive enforcement mechanisms for protection of a federal 
right and those mechanisms did not include a private right of 
action, a litigant could not obtain a private right of action by 
asserting his claim under§ 1983. The Court of Appeals rec-
ognized that Sea Clammers might not logically preclude a 
§ 1983 action for violation of the EHA, since the EHA ex-
6 The District Court purported to award relief on the basis of state law. 
In light of the decision in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. 
Halderman, -- U. S. -- (1984), that was improper. The propriety of 
the injunctive relief, however, is not at issue here. We think the Court of 
Appeals was correct in treating the relief as essentially awarded under the 
EHA, since petitioners had challenged the State Commissioner's construc-
tion of state law on the basis of their rights under the EHA, and since the 
question of state law on which petitioners prevailed was certified by the 
District Court in an effort to avoid a Supremacy Clause conflict with the 
EHA. It is clear that the EHA creates a right, enforceable in federal 
court, to the free appropriate public education required by the statute. 
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pressly recognizes a private right of action, but it does sup-
port the more general proposition that when a statute creates 
a comprehensive remedial scheme, intentional "omissions" 
from that scheme should not be supplanted by the remedial 
apparatus of§ 1983. In the view of the Court of Appeals, the 
fact that the § 1983 claims alleged here were based on inde-
pendent constitutional violations rather than violations of the 
EHA was immaterial. The constitutional claims alleged-a 
denial of due process and a denial of a free appropriate public 
education because of handicap-are factually identical to the 
EHA claims. If a litigant could obtain fees simply by an in-
cantation of § 1983, fees would become available in almost 
every case. 7 
The court disposed of the Rehabilitation Act basis for fees 
in a similar fashion. Even if Congress did not specifically in-
tend to pre-empt § 504 claims with the EHA, the EHA's com-
prehensive remedial scheme entails a rejection of fee-shifting 
that properly limits the fees provision of the more general 
Rehabilitation Act. 
Because of confusion in the circuits over the proper inter-
play among the various statutory and constitutional bases for 
relief in cases of this nature, and over the effect of that inter-
play on the provision of attorney's fees, 8 we granted certio-
rari, - U. S. - (1983). 
7 The Court of Appeals added that it did not intend to indicate that the 
EHA in any way limits the scope of a handicapped child's constitutional 
rights. Claims not covered by the EHA should still be cognizable under 
§ 1983, with fees available for such actions. The court noted, for instance, 
that to the extent petitioners' securing of a preliminary injunction fell out-
side any relief available under the EHA, attorney's fees might be appropri-
ate for that relief. Because the award of fees against the School Commit-
tee for work done in obtaining the preliminary injunction was not 
challenged on appeal, the court had no occasion to decide the issue. 
8 See, e. g., Quackenbush v. Johnson City School District, 716 F . 2d 141 
(CA2 1983) (§ 1983 remedy, including damages, available for claim that 
plaintiff was denied access to EHA procedures); Department of Education 
v. Katherine D., 727 F . 2d 809 (CA 9 1983) (EHA precludes reliance on 
-
82-2120-0PINION 




Petitioners insist that the Court of Appeals simply ignored 
the guidance of this Court in Maher v. Gagne, supra, that a 
prevailing party who asserts substantial but unaddressed 
constitutional claims is entitled to attorney's fees under 42 
U. S. C. § 1988. They urge that the reliance of the Court of 
Appeals on Sea Clammers was misplaced. Sea Clammers 
had to do only with an effort to enlarge a statutory remedy 
by asserting a claim based on that statute under the "and 
laws" provision of § 1983. 9 In this case, petitioners made no 
effort to enlarge the remedies available under the EHA by 
asserting their claim through the "and laws" provision of 
§ 1983. They presented separate constitutional claims, 
properly cognizable under § 1983. Since the claim on which 
they prevailed and their constitutional claims arose out of a 
"common nucleus of operative fact," Maher v. Gagne, 448 
U. S., at 132, n. 15, quoting H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 4, n. 
7 (1976), and since the constitutional claims were found by 
the District Court and assumed by the Court of Appeals to be 
substantial, petitioners urge that they are entitled to fees 
under § 1988. In addition, petitioners presented a substan-
§ 1983 or § 504); Robert M. v. Benton, 671 F. 2d 1104 (CA8 1982) (fees 
available under § 1988 because plaintiff made colorable due process as well 
as EHA challenges to use of state agency employee as hearing officer); 
Hymes v. Harnett County Board of Education, 664 F. 2d 410 (CA4 1981) 
(claims made under the EHA, § 504 and § 1983; fees available for due proc-
ess relief not available under the EHA); Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F. 2d 
1205 (CA7 1981) (EHA claim not assertable under § 1983; attorney's fees 
therefore not available). 
' 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides a remedy for a deprivation, under color of 
state law, "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws" (emphasis added). In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 
(1980), the Court held that § 1983 authorizes suits to redress violations by 
state officials of rights created by federal statutes as well as by the Federal 
Constitution and that fees are available under § 1988 for such statutory 
violations. 
Sea Clammers excluded from the reach of Thiboutot cases in which Con-




SMITH v. ROBINSON 
-
tial claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Since § 505 
of that Act authorizes attorney's fees in the same manner as 
does § 1988 and in fact incorporates the legislative history of 
§ 1988, see 124 Cong. Rec. 30346 (1978) (remarks of Sen. 
Cranston), the reasoning of Maher applies to claims based on 
§ 504. Petitioners therefore, it is claimed, are entitled to 
fees for substantial, though unaddressed, § 504 claims. 
Respondents counter that petitioners simply are attempt-
ing to circumvent the lack of a provision for attorney's fees in 
the EHA by resorting to the pleading trick of adding surplus 
constitutional claims and similar claims under § 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act. Whatever Congress' intent was in au-
thorizing fees for substantial, unaddressed claims based on 
§ 1988 or § 505, it could not have been to allow plaintiffs to 
receive an award of attorney's fees in a situation where Con-
gress has made clear its intent that fees not be available. 
Resolution of this dispute requires us to explore congres-
sional intent, both in authorizing fees for substantial 
unaddressed constitutional claims and in setting out the elab-
orate substantive and procedural requirements of the EHA, 
with no indication that attorney's fees are available in an ac-
tion to enforce those requirements. We turn first to peti-
tioners' claim that they were entitled to fees under 42 
U. S. C. § 1988 because they asserted substantial constitu-
tional claims. 
III 
As the legislative history illustrates and as this Court has 
recognized, § 1988 is a broad grant of authority to courts to 
award attorney's fees to plaintiffs seeking to vindicate federal 
constitutional and statutory rights. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 
U. S. 1, 9 (1980); Maher v. Gagne, supra; Hutto v. Finney, 
437 U. S. 678, 694 (1978); S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 4 (1976) (a 
prevailing plaintiff "'should ordinarily recover an attorney's 
fee unless special circumstances would render such an award 
unjust,"' quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 
390 U. S. 400, 402 (1968)). Congress did not intend to have 
-
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that authority extinguished by the fact that the case was set-
tled or resolved on a nonconstitutional ground. Maher v. 
Gagne, 448 U. S., at 132. As th~ ed, 
however, the authority to award fees m a case where the 
plaintiff prevails on su stantial constitutiona claims is not 
without qua 1 cation. Due regard must be paid, not only to 
the fact that a plaintiff "prevailed," but also to the relation-
ship between the claims on which effort was expended and 
the ultimate reli~f aj)tained. vflensley v. Eckerhart, --
U.S. - (1983),l-BZum v. Stenson, - U.S. - (1984). 
Thus, for example, fees are not properly awarded for work 
done on a claim on which a plaintiff did not prevail and which 
involved distinctly different facts and legal theories from the 
claims on the basis of which relief was awarded. Hensley v. 
Eckerhart, -- U. S., at--. Although, in most cases, 
there is no clear line between hours of work that contributed 
to a plaintiff's success and those that did not, district courts 
remain charged with the responsibility, imposed by Con-
gress, of evaluating the award requested in light of the rela-
tionship between particular claims for which work is done 
and the plaintiff's success. Id., at -- - --. 
A similar analysis is appro riate in a case like this, where 
the prevailing plaintiffs rely on substantial, unaddressed con-
stitutional claims as the basis for an award of attorney's fees. 
The fact that constitutional claims are made does not render 
automa 1c an awar o fees for e entire proceeding. Con-
gress' purpose in au onzing a ee award for an unaddressed 
constitutional claim was to avoid penalizing a litigant for the 
fact that courts are properly reluctant to resolve constitu-
tional questions if a nonconstitutional claim is dispositive. 
H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 4, n. 7. That purpose does not 
alter the requirement that a claim for which fees are awarded 
be reasonably related to the plaintiff 's ultimate success. It 
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has prevailed on his fee-generating claim and to award fees 
appropriate to that success. 10 
In light of the requirement that a claim for which fees are 
awarded be reasonably related to the plaintiff's ultimate suc-
cess, it is clear that plaintiffs may not rely simply on the fact 
that substantial fee-generating claims were made during the 
course of the litigation. Closer examination of the nature of 
the claims and the relationship between those claims and pe-
titioners' ultimate success is required. 
Besides making a claim under the EHA, petitioners as-
serted at two different points in the proceedings that proce-
dures employed by state officials denied them due process. 
They also claimed that Tommy was being discriminated 
against on the basis of his handicapping condition, in violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
A 
The first due process claim may be disposed of briefly. 
Petitioners challenged the refusal of the School Board to 
grant them a full hearing before terminating Tommy's fund-
ing. Petitioners were awarded fees. against the School 
Board for tn eir efforts in obtaining an injunction to prevent 
that due process deprivation. The award was not challenged 
on appeal and we therefore assume that it was proper. 
The fact that petitioners prevailed on their initial due proc-
ess claim, however, by itself does not entitle them to fees for 
the subsequent administrative and judicial proceedings. 
The due process claim that entitled petitioners to an order 
10 The legislative history also makes clear that the fact that a plaintiff has 
prevailed on one of two or more alternative bases for relief does not pre-
vent an award of fees for the unaddressed claims, as long as those claims 
are reasonably related to the plaintiff 's ultimate success. See S. Rep. No. 
94-1011, p. 6 (1976), citing Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 EPD ,J 9444 
(CD Cal. 1974). See also Hensley v. Eckerhart, -- U. S., at--. The 
same rule should apply when an unaddressed constitutional claim provides 




SMITH v. ROBINSON 
-
15 
maintaining Tommy's placement throughout the course of the 
subsequent proceedings is entirely separate from the claims 
petitioners made in those proceedings. Nor were those pro-
ceedings necessitated by the School Board's failings. Even 
if the School Board had complied with state regulations and 
had guaranteed Tommy's continued placement pending ad-
ministrative review of its decision, petitioners still would 
have had to avail themselves of the administrative process in 
order to obtain the permanent relief they wanted-an inter-
pretation of state law that placed on the School Board the ob-
ligation to pay for Tommy's education. Petitioners' initial 
due process claim is not sufficiently related to their ultimate 
success to support an award of fees for the entire proceeding. 
We turn, therefore, to petitioners' other § 1983 claims. 
As petitioners emphasize, their § 1983 claims were not 
based on alleged violations of the EHA, 11 but on independent 
claims of constitutional deprivations. As the Court of-Ap-
peals recognized, however, petitioners' constitutional claims, 
a denial of due process and a denial of a free appropriate pub-
lic education as guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause, ---:;; _ /. f") 
are virtually identical to their EHA claims. 12 The question l l-1..Z. J 
to be asKed, therefore, is whether Congress intended that 
11 Courts generally agree that the EHA may not be claimed as the basis 
for a§ 1983 action. See, e. g., Quackenbush v. Johnson City School Dis-
trict, supra; Department of Education v. Katherine D., supra; Anderson 
v. Thompson, supra. 
12 The timing of the filing of petitioners' second amended complaint, after 
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island had ruled that petitioners were enti-
tled to the relief they sought, reveals that the equal protection claim added 
nothing to petitioners' claims under the EHA and provides an alternative 
basis for denying attorney's fees on the basis of that claim. There is, of 
course, nothing wrong with seeking relief on the basis of certain statutes 
because those statutes provide for attorney's fees, or with amending a com-
plaint to include claims that provide for attorney's fees. But where it is 
clear that the claims that provide for attorney's fees had nothing to do with 
a plaintiff's success, Hensley v. Eckerhart, supra, requires that fees not be 
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the EHA be the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff 
may assert those claims. 
B 
We have little difficulty concluding that Congress intended 
the EHA to be the exclusive avenue throughwluch a plamtiff 
may asse an equa protection claim o a ublicl financed 
special education. The EHA is com rehensive schem set 
up by Congress to aid the States in complying wit their con-
stitutional obligations to provide public education for handi-
capped children. Both the provisions of the statute and its 
legislative history indicate that Congress intended handi-
capped children with constitutional claims to a free appropri-
ate public education to pursue those claims through the care-
fully tailored administrative and judicial mechanism set out in 
the statute. 
In the statement of findingg with which the EHA begins, 
Congress noted that there were more than 8,000,000 handi-
capped children in the country, the special education needs of 
most of whom were not being fully met. 20 U. S. C. 
§§ 1400(b)(l), (2), and (3). Congress also recognized that in a 
series of "landmark court cases," the right to an equal educa-
tion opportunity for handicapped children had been estab-
lished. S. Rep. No. 94-168, p. 6 (1975). See also id., at 13 
(''It is the intent of the Committee to establish and prote<!t 
the right to education for all handicapped children and to pro-
vide assistance to the States in carrying out their responsibil-
ities under State law and the Constitution of the United 
States to provide equal protection of the laws"). The EHA 
was an attempt to relieve the fiscal burden placed on States 
and localities by their responsibility to provide education for 
all handicapped children. 20 U. S. C. §§ 1400(b)(8) and (9). 
At the same time, however, Congress made clear that the 
EHA is not simply a funding statute. The responsibility for 
providing the required education remains on the States. S. 
Rep. No. 94-168, at 22. And the Act establishes an enforce-
-
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able substantive right to a free appropriate public education. 
See Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176 (1982). 
See also 121 Cong. Rec. 37417 (1975) (statement of Sen. 
Schweiker: "It can no longer be the policy of the Government 
to merely establish an unenforceable goal requiring all chil-
dren to be in school. [The bill] takes positive necessary 
steps to insure that the rights of children and their families 
are protected"). 13 Finally, the Act establishes an elaborate 
procedural mechanism to protect the rights of handicapped 
children. The procedures not only ensure that hearings con-
ducted by the State are fair and adequate. They also effect 
Congress' intent that each child's individual educational 
needs be worked out through a process that begins on the 
local level and includes ongoing parental involvement, de-
tailed procedural safeguards, and a right to judicial review. 
§§ 1412(4), 1414(a)(5), 1415. See also S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 
11-~2 (emphasizing the role of parental involvement in assur-
ing that appropriate services are provided to a handicapped 
child); id., at p. 22; Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U. S., 
at 208-209. 
In light of the comprehensive nature of the procedures and 
guarantees set out in the EHA and Congress' express efforts 
to place on local and state educational agencies the primary 
responsibility for developing a plan to accommodate the 
needs of each individual handicapped child, we find it difficult 
to believe that Congress also meant to leave undisturbed the 
13 Prior to 1975, federal provisions for the education of handicapped chil-
dren were contained in the Education of the Handicapped Act, passed in 
1970, 84 Stat. 175, and amended in 1974, 88 Stat. 579 (current version at 20 
U. S. C. § 1400 et seq.). The Act then provided for grants to States to fa-
cilitate the development of programs for the education of handicapped chil-
dren. § 611(a). The only requirements imposed on the States were that 
they use federal funds on programs designed to meet the special education 
needs of handicapped children, § 613(a), and that parents or guardians be 
guaranteed minimum procedural safeguards, including prior notice and an 
opportunity to be heard when a State proposed to change the educational 
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ability of a handicapped child to go directly to court with an J 
equal protection claim to a free appropriate public educa-
tion. 14 Not only would such a result render superfluous most 
of the detailed procedural protections outlined in the statute, 
but, more important, it would run counter to Congress' view 
that the needs of handicapped children are best accommo-
dated by having the parents and the local education agency 
work together to formulate an individualized plan for each 
handicapped child's education. No federal district court pre-
sented with a constitutional claim to a public education can 
duplicate that process. ( 
We do not lightly conclude that Congress intended to pre-
clude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy for a substantial equal 
protection claim. Since 1871, when it was passed by Con-
gress, § 1983 has stood as an independent safeguard against 
deprivations of federal constitutional and statutory rights. 
See Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496 (1982); 
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 242 (1972); Monroe v. 
Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183 (1961). Nevertheless, § 1983 is a 
statutory remedy and Congress retains the authority to re-
14 The District Court in this case relied on similar reasoning-that Con-
gress could not have meant for a plaintiff to be able to circumvent the EHA 
administrative process-and concluded that a handicapped child asserting 
an equal protection claim to public education was required to exhaust his 
administrative remedies before making his § 1983 claim. See Turillo v. 
Tyson, 535 F . Supp. 577, 583 (R. I. 1982), cited in the District Court's oral 
decision of April 30, 1982, App. to Pet. for Cert. A40. Because exhaustion 
was required, the court, relying on New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. 
Carey, 447 U. S. 54 (1980), concluded that attorney's fees were appropri-
ate under § 1988 for work performed in the state administrative process. 
The difference between Carey and this case is that in Carey , the statute 
that authorized fees , Title VII , also required a plaintiff to pursue available 
state administrative remedies. In contrast, nothing in § 1983 requires 
that a plaintiff exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing a 
§ 1983 suit. See Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496 (1982). 
If§ 1983 stood as an independent avenue of relief for petitioners, then they 
could go straight to court to assert it. 
-
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peal it or replace it with an alternative remedy. 15 The crucial 
consideration is what Congress intended. See Brown v. 
GSA, 425 U. S. 820, 82&-829 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Ex-
press Agency, 421 U. S. 454, 459 (1975); Adickes v. S. H. 
Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 151, n. 5 (1970). 
In this case, we think Congress' intent is clear. Allowing 
a plaintiff to circumvent ~tive remedies 
would be inconsistent with Congress' carefully tailored 
scheme. The legislative history gives no indication that 
Congress intended such a result. 16 Rather, it indicates that 
1
• There is no issue here of Congress' ability to preclude the federal 
courts from granting a remedy for a constitutional deprivation. Even if 
Congress repealed all statutory remedies for constitutional violations, the 
power of federal courts to grant the relief necessary to protect against con-
stitutional deprivations or to remedy the wrong done is presumed to be 
available. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 684 (1946); Bivens v. Six Un-
known Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 396 (1971); id., at 400-406 
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). 
1
• Petitioners insist that regardless of the wisdom of requiring resort to 
available EHA remedies before a handicapped child may seek judicial re-
view, Congress specifically indicated that it did not intend to limit the judi-
cial remedies otherwise available to a handicapped child. If that were 
true, we would agree with petitioners that Congress' intent is controlling 
and that a § 1983 remedy remained available to them. See Johnson v. 
Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S. 454, 459 (1975). The sentence in the 
legislative history on which petitioners rely, however, is not the clear ex-
pression of congressional intent petitioners would like it to be. 
The sentence on which petitioners rely is included in the Committee Re-
port of the Senate's version of the EHA. S. Rep. No. 94-168, pp. 27-28 
(1975). The Senate bill included a requirement, not in the Conference bill, 
see Senate Conference Report No. 94-455, pp. 39-40 (1975), that the 
States set up an entity for ensuring compliance with the EHA. The com-
pliance entity would be authorized, inter alia, to receive complaints re-
garding alleged violations of the Act. The Committee added that it did 
"not intend the existence of such an entity to limit the right of individuals 
to seek redress of grievances through other avenues, such as bringing civil 
action in Federal or State courts to protect and enforce the rights of handi-
capped children under applicable law." S. Rep. No. 94-168, p. 26 (1975). 
In the context in which the statement was made, it appears to establish 
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Congress perceived the EHA as the most effective vehicle 
for protecting the constituti n · t of a handicapped child 
to a public education. e conclude therefore, that where 
the EHA is available to a an 1capped child asserting a right 
to a free appropriate public education, based either on the 
EHA or on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the EHA is the exclusive avenue through which 
the child and his parents or guardian can pursue their claim. 
C 
Petitioners also made a dµe process challenge to the par-
tiality of the s a e earmg o cer. e ques 10n whether 
this claim will support an award of attorney's fees has two as-
pects- whether the procedural safeguards set out in the 
EHA manifest Congress' intent to preclude resort to § 1983 
Ellll ~ 
q..~ 
on a due process challenge and, if not, whether petitioners 
are entitled to attorney's fees for their due process claim. 
We find it unnecessary to resolve the first question, because j 
we are satisfied that even if an independent due process chal-
lenge may be maintained, petitioners are not entitled to at-
torney's fees for their particular claim. 17 
view of their individual cases. It does not establish that they can choose 
whether to avail themselves of the EHA process or go straight to court 
with an equal protection claim. 
17 We note that the issue is not the same as that presented by a substan-
tive equal protection claim to a free appropriate public education. The 
EHA does set out specific procedural safeguards that must be guaranteed 
by a State seeking funds under the Act. See 20 U. S. C. § 1415. And 
although some courts have concluded that the EHA does not authorize in-
junctive relief to remedy procedural deficiencies, see, e. g., Hymes v. 
Harnett County Board of Education, 664 F. 2d 410 (CA4 1981), other 
courts have construed the district courts' authority under § 1415(e)(2) to 
grant "appropriate relief" as including the authority to grant injunctive re-
lief, either after an unsuccessful and allegedly unfair administrative pro-
ceeding, or prior to exhaustion of the state remedies if pursuing those rem-
edies would be futile or inadequate. See, e. g. , Robert M. v. Benton, 622 
F. 2d 370 (CA8 1980); Monahan v. N ebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074 (Neb. 
1980), aff 'd in part and vacated in part, 645 F . 2d 592 (CA8 1981); Howard 
S . v. Friendwood lnde'[Jendent School District, 454 F. Supp. 634 (SD Tex. 
-
82--2120-OPINION 
SMITH v. ROBINSON 
-
21 
Petitioners' plea for injunctive relief was not made until 
after the administrative proceedings had ended. They did 
not seek an order requiring the Commissioner of Education 
to grant them a new hearing, but only a declaratory judg-
ment that the state regulations did not comply with the re-
quirements of due process and the EHA, and an injunction 
prohibiting the Commissioner from conducting further hear-
ings under those regulations. App. 59-60. That due proc-
ess claim and the substantive claim on which petitioners ulti-
mately prevailed involved entirely separate legal theories 
and, more important, would have warranted entirely differ-
ent relief. According to their complaint, petitioners did not 
even seek relief for themselves on the due process claim, but 
sought only to protect the rights of others coming after them 
in the administrative process. The efforts petitioners subse-
quently expended in the judicial process addressed only the 
substantive question as to which agency, as a matter of state 
and federal law, was required to pay for Tommy's education. 
1978); Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 601-602 (ED Pa. 1979), re-
manded on other grounds sub nom. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F. 2d 269 
(CA3 1980), cert. denied, 452 U. S. 968 (1981); North v. District of Colum-
bia Board of Education, 471 F. Supp. 136 (D. C. 1979). See also 121 
Cong. Rec. 37416 (1975) (remarks ofSen. Williams) ("exhaustion of the ad-
ministrative procedures established under this part should not be required 
for any individual complainant filing a judicial action in cases where such 
exhaustion would be futile either as a legal or practical matter"). 
On the other hand, unlike an independent equal protection claim, mainte-
nance of an independent due process challenge to state procedures would 
not be inconsistent with the EHA's comprehensive scheme. Under either 
the EHA or § 1983, a plaintiff would be entitled to bypass the adminis-
trative process by obtaining injunctive relief only on a showing that irrepa-
rable harm otherwise would result. See Monahan v. Nebraska, 645 F . 2d 
592, 598-599 (CAB 1981). And, while Congress apparently has deter-
mined that local and state agencies should not be burdened with attorney's 
fees to litigants who succeed, through resort to the procedures outlined in 
the EHA, in requiring those agencies to provide free schooling, there is no 
indication that agencies should be exempt from a fee award where plaintiffs 
have had to resort to judicial relief to force the agencies to provide them 
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Whether or not the state procedures accorded petitioners the 
process they were due had no bearing on that substantive 
question. 
We conclude that where, as here, petitioners have pre-
sented distinctly different claims for different relief, based on 
different facts and legal theories, and have prevailed only on 
a non-fee claim, they are not entitled to a fee award simply 
because the other claim was a constitutional claim that could 
be asserted through§ 1983. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, --
U. S., at--. We note that a contrary conclusion would 
mean that every EHA plaintiff who seeks judicial review 
after an adverse agency determination could ensure a fee 
award for successful judicial efforts simply by including in his 
substantive challenge a claim that the administrative process 
was unfair. If the court ignored the due process claim but 
granted substantive relief, the due process claim could be 
considered a substantial unaddressed constitutional claim and 
the plaintiff would be entitled to fees. 18 It is unlikely that 
Congress intended such a result. 
IV 
We turn, finally, to petitioners' claim that they were enti-
tled to fees under § 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, because 
they asserted a substantial claim for relief under § 504 of that 
Act. 
Much of our analysis of petitioners' equal protection claim 
is applicable here. The EHA is a comprehensive scheme de-
signed by Congress as the most effective way to protect the 
18 Even if the court denied the due process claim, as here, it is arguable 
that the plaintiff would be entitled to have an appellate court determine 
whether the district court was correct in its ruling on the due process 
claim. In this case, the District Court ruled against petitioners on their 
due process claim and the Court of Appeals determined, on appeal from the 
District Court's award of substantive relief, that the issue was moot. 
Nevertheless, in considering the propriety of the District Court's award of 
fees , the Court of Appeals recognized that the due process claim was at 
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right of a handicapped child to a free appropriate public edu-
cation. We concluded above that in enacting the EHA, Con-
gress was aware of, and intended to accommodate, the claims 
of handicapped children that the Equal Protection Clause re-
quired that they be ensured access to public education. We 
also concluded that Congress did not intend to have the EHA 
scheme circumvented by resort to the more general provi-
sions of § 1983. We reach the same conclusion regarding pe-
titioners' § 504 claim. The relationship between the EHA 
and § 504, however, requires a slightly different analysis 
from that required by petitioners' equal protection claim. 
Section 504 and the EHA are different substantive stat-
utes. While the EHA guarantees a right to a free appropri-
ate public education, § 504 simply prevents discrimination on 
the basis of handicap. But while the EHA is limited to 
handicapped children seeking access to public education, 
§ 504 protects handicapped persons of all ages from dis-
crimination in a variety of programs and activities receiving 
federal financial assistance. 
Because both statutes are built around fundamental no-
tions of equal access to state programs and facilities , their 
substantive requirements, as applied to the right of a handi-
capped child to a public education, have been interpreted to 
be strikingly similar. In regulations promulgated pursuant 
to § 504, the Secretary of Education 19 has interpreted § 504 as 
requiring a recipient of federal funds that operates a public 
elementary or secondary education program to provide a free 
appropriate public education to each qualified handicapped 
person in the recipient's jurisdiction. 34 CFR § 104.33(a) 
1
• The regulations were promulgated by the Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare (HEW). 42 Fed. Reg. 22676 (1977). The functions of 
the Secretary of HEW under the Rehabilitation Act and under the EHA 
were transferred in 1979 to the Secretary of Education under the Depart-






SMITH v. ROBINSON 
-
(1983). 20 The requirement extends to the provision of a pub-
lic or private residential placement if necessary to provide a 
free appropriate public education. § 104.33(c)(3). The regu-
lations also require that the recipient implement procedural 
safeguards, including notice, an opportunity for the parents 
or guardian to examine relevant records, an impartial hear-
ing with opportunity for participation by the parents or 
guardian and representation by counsel, and a review proce-
dure. § 104.36. The Secretary declined to require the exact 
EHA procedures, because those procedures might be inap-
propriate for some recipients not subject to the EHA, see 34 
CFR, subtitle B, ch. 1, App. A, p. 371, but indicated that 
compliance with EHA procedures would satisfy § 104.36. 
On the other hand, although both statutes begin with an 
equal protecton premise that handicapped children must be 
given access to public education, it does not follow that the 
affirmative requirements imposed by the two statutes are the 
same. The significant difference between the two, as ap-
plied to special education claims, is that the substantive and 
procedural rights assumed to be guaranteed by both statutes 
are specifically required only by the EHA. 
Section 504, 29 U. S. C. § 794, provides, in pertinent part, 
that: 
"No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the 
United States, ... shall, solely by reason of his handi-
cap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
00 Regulations under § 504 and the EHA were being formulated at the 
same time. The § 504 regulations were effective June 3, 1977. 42 Fed. 
Reg. , at 22676. The EHA regulations were effective October 1, 1977. 
Id., at 42474. The Secretary of HEW and the Commissioner of Education 
emphasized the coordination of effort behind the two sets of regulations 
and the Department's intent that the § 504 regulations be consistent with 
the requirements of the EHA. See 41 Fed. Reg. 56967 (1976); 42 Fed. 
Reg., at 22677. 
-
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program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance .... " 
In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 
397 (1979), the Court emphasized that § 504 does not require 
affirmative action on behalf of handicapped persons, but only 
the absence of discrimination against those persons. 442 
U. S., at 411-412. In lighfof Davis, courts construing§ 504 
as applied to the educational needs of handicapped children 
have expressed confusion about the extent to which § 504 re-
quires special services necessary to make public education ac-
cessible to handicapped children. 21 
In the EHA, on the other hand, Congress specified the af-
firmative obligations imposed on States to ensure that equal 
access to a public education is not an empty guarantee, but 
offers some benefit to a handicapped child. Thus, the stat-
ute specifically requires "such . . . supportive services . . . as 
may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from 
special education," see Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 
U. S., at 200, including, if the public facilities are inadequate 
for the needs of the child, "instruction in hospitals and insti-
tutions." 20 U. S. C. §§ 1401(16) and (17). 
We need not decide the extent of the guarantee of a free 
appropriate public education Congress intended to impose 
under § 504. We note the uncertainty regarding the reach of 
§ 504 to emphasize that it is only in the EHA that Congress 
specified the rights and remedies available to a handicapped 
child seeking access to public education. Even assuming 
that the reach of § 504 is coextensive with that of the EHA, 
21 Courts generally have upheld the § 504 regulations on the grounds that 
they do not require extensive modification of existing programs and that 
States and localities generally provide nonhandicapped children with edu-
cational services appropriate to their needs. See Phipps v. New Hanover 
County Board of Education, 551 F. Supp. 732 (ED N. C. 1982). But see 
Colin K. v. Schmidt, 715 F. 2d 1, 9 (CAl 1983) (in light of Davis, require-
ment that a school system provide a private residential placement could not 
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there is no doubt that the remedies, rights, and procedures. 
Congress set out in the EHA are the ones it intended to 
apply to a handicapped child's claim to a free appropriate 
public education. We are satisfied that Congress did not in-
tend a handicapped child to be able to circumvent the re-
quirements or supplement the remedies of the EHA by re-
sort to the general antidiscrimination provision of § 504. 
There is no suggestion that § 504 adds anything to petition-
ers' substantive right to a free appropriate public education. 22 
The only elements added by § 504 are the possibility of 
circumventing EHA administrative procedures and going 
straight to court with a § 504 claim, 23 the possibility of a dam-
ages award in cases where no such award is available under 
the EHA, 24 and attorney's fees. As discussed above, Con-
gress' intent to place on local and state educational agencies 
the responsibility for determining the most appropriate edu-
22 Of course, if a State provided services beyond those required by the 
EHA, but discriminatorily denied those services to a handicapped child, 
§ 504 would remain available to the child as an avenue of relief. In view of 
the substantial overlap between the two statutes and Congress' intent that 
efforts to accommodate educational needs be made first on the local level, 
the presumption in a case involving a claim arguably with the EHA should 
be that the plaintiff is required to exhaust EHA remedies, unless doing so 
would be futile. 
23 Lower courts appear to agree, however, that unless doing so would be 
futile, EHA administrative remedies must be exhausted before a § 504 
claim for the same relief available under the EHA may be brought. See, 
e.g., Riley v. Ambach, 668 F. 2d 635 (CA2 1981); Phipps v. New Hanover 
County Board of Education, supra; Harris v. Campbell, 472 F . Supp. 51 
(ED Va. 1979); H. R. v. Hornbeck, 524 F . Supp. 215 (Md. 1981). 
24 There is some confusion among the circuits as to the availability of a 
damages remedy under § 504 and under the EHA. Without expressing an 
opinion on the matter, we note that courts generally agree that damages 
are available under § 504, but are available under the EHA only in excep-
tional circumstances. ·See, e.g., Miener v. Missouri, 673 F . 2d 969, 978 
(CA8 1982), cert. denied, -- U. S. -- (1983); Anderson v. Thompson, 
658 F. 2d 1205 (CA7 1981); Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F . Supp., at 1094; 
Hurry v. Jones, 560 F. Supp. 500 (R. I. 1983); Gregg B . v. Board of Educa-
tion, 535 F. Supp. 1333, 1339-1340 (ED N. Y. 1982). 
-
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cational plan for a handicapped child is clear. To the extent 
§ 504 otherwise would allow a plaintiff to circumvent that 
state procedure, we are satisfied that the remedy conflicts 
with Congress' intent in the EHA. 
Congress did not explain the absence of a provision for a 
damages remedy and attorney's fees in the EHA. Several 
references in the statute itself and in its legislative history, 
however, indicate that the omissions were in response to 
Congress' awareness of the financial burden already imposed 
on States by the responsibility of providing education for 
handicapped children. As noted above, one of the stated 
purposes of the statute was to relieve this financial burden. 
See 20 U. S. C. §§ 1400(b)(8) and (9). Discussions of the 
EHA by its proponents reflect Congress' intent to "make 
every resource, or as much as possible, ·available to the direct 
activities and the direct programs that are going to benefit 
the handicapped." 121 Cong. Rec. 19501 (1975) (remarks of 
Sen. Dole). See also id., at 37025 (procedural safeguards 
designed to further the congressional goal of ensuring full 
educational opportunity without overburdening the local 
school districts and state educational agencies) (remarks of 
Rep. Perkins); S. Rep. No. 94-168, p. 81 (minority views cog-
nizant of financial burdens on localities). The Act appears to 
represent Congress' judgment that the best way to ensure a 
free appropriate public education for handicapped children is 
to clarify and make enforceable the rights of those children 
while at the same time endeavoring to relieve the financial 
burden imposed on the agencies responsible to guarantee 
those rights. Where § 504 adds nothing to the substantive 
rights of a handicapped child, we cannot believe that Con-
gress intended to have the careful balance struck in the EHA 
upset by reliance on§ 504 for otherwise unavailable damages 
or for an award of attorney's fees. 
We emphasize the narrowness of our holding. We do not 
address a situation w~vailable or where 
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4, - -err 06/02/84 ,g 
RE: No. 82-2120, Smith v. Robinson 
TO: Justice Powell t;.~ ~- , 
FROM: Cammie J . ~ ~
~ -~.J~~,~ 
 r.1-4- ~~. 
You were right -- this opinion is too long. It i s f how-fe, / 2--
ever, consistent with your vote at Conference, and I recommend 
that you join. The procedural history is complicated. See pp. 
1-10. Relevant here is the fact that after completing adminis-
trative remedies, petrs filed a first amended complaint in feder-
al DC consisting of two counts -- Count One was a procedural due 
process claim under §1983 (seep. 4); Count Two was a substantive 
claim under state law and the EHA (see p.5). If they prevailed, 
Petrs could recover attorneys fees on count one but not on count 
two. The DC certified the substantive state law claim to the 
state supreme court, which resolved it in favor of petrs. This 
result gave petrs all they asked for on their substantive claim. 
Thereafter, petrs filed a second amended complaint in DC adding 
to Count Two claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th 
Amendment and under §504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Claims under 
both these provisions would entitle prevailing plaintiffs to at-
torneys fees. 
recover fees 
The questions presented here are whether petrs 
under their Equal Protection claim, their 
may ~ 
§504 (/ 
claim, or their procedural due process claims. CAl said no and 
this Court agrees. 




1. Under Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980), when the claim 
upon which a plaintiff actually prevails is accompanied by a 
"substantial, 11 though undecided, §1983 claim arising from the 
same nucleus of facts, a fee award is appropriate. At pages 13-
14, Justice Blackmun establishes the additional .re 
the unaddressed §1983 claim be 11 ~ ed" to the claim } 
on which the plaintiff prevailed. This requirement is taken from 'f4-
Hensley and Blum and seems to be a good one. 
2. Justice Blackmun then applies the "reasonably related 11 
test to the §1983 claims asserted here. 
(a) He holds first that petrs' claim that the School 
Board violated procedural due process by not granting a hearing 
before terminating Tommy's education is not reasonably related to 
the claims on which petrs prevailed. See page 15. I agree with 
this. 
(b) Later in the opinion, he holds that pet rs' claim 
that the subsequent administrative proceedings violated procedur-
al due process by failing to provide unbiased hearing officers 
was is not reasonably related to the claims on which petrs pre-
vailed. See pages 21-22. I agree with this. Justice Blackmun 
says that he need not also determine whether Congress intended 
the EHA to be the exclusive remedy for this due process claim. 
Page 20. However, he seems to decide the issue in note 17 and to 
find that the EHA is not the exclusive remedy. I would eliminate 
that note as unnecessary. 
(c) Justice Blackmun finds that the other §1983 claims -
- the equal protection claim and the due process claim that the 
t'~~\;;; -· 
- -
agency did not provide unbiased hearing officers -- are "reason-
ably related" to the EHA claims on which petrs prevailed. See 
page 15. I agree with this. 
3. Justice Blackmun then sets out to determine whether Con-
gress intended the EHA to be the exclusive avenue for vindicating 
the substantive right at issue here, making unavailable any claim 
for relief or fees under the equal protection claim. 
Justice Blackmun concludes that the EHA is the exclusive 
remedy and that petrs therefore are not entitled to fees for the 
equal protection claim. See pages 16-20. He also indicates in a 
footnote that fees are inappropriate on the alternate ground that 
the equal protection claim was added after success on the sub-
s tan ti ve claim was clear, and therefore seems a ploy for fees. 
See note 12 at page 15. I agree with both these conclusions, but 
would eliminate note 15 as unnecessary. 
4. Justice Blackmun's long discussion of the §504 claim boils 
down to the fact that this claim is precluded for the same reason 
the equal protection claim is precluded -- the EHA provides the 
~ -
exclusive remedy. See pages 22-28. I agree with this conclu-
sion. 
-
June 4, 1984 
82-2120 Smith v. Robinson 
Dear Harry: 
Please joi.n me. 
Justice Blackmun 
lfp/ss 
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.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE June 4, 198 
Re: 82-2120 - Smith v. Robinson 
Dear Harry, 
I had thought there was a fairly good 
argument that Maher controlled this case, 
and my conference vote was cast on that 
basis. However, the views I have expressed 
in the past make me sympathetic to your 
draft; and if it commands a majority, which 
I assume it will, I shall table a planned 
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Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely~ 
Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
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Dear Harry, 
Having looked this case over again, I 
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